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Abstract 
The poor in developing countries are the most exposed to natural catastrophes and 
microfinance organizations may potentially ease their economic recovery. Yet, no 
evidence on MFIs strategies after natural disasters exists. We aim to fill this gap with 
a database which merges bank records of loans, issued before and after the 2004 
Tsunami by a Sri Lankan MFI recapitalized by Western donors, with detailed survey 
data on the corresponding borrowers. Evidence of effective post-calamity intervention 
is supported since the defaults in the post-Tsunami years (2004-2006) do not imply 
smaller loans in the period following the recovery (2007-2011) while Tsunami damages 
increase their size. Furthermore, a cross-subsidization mechanism is in place: clients 
with a long successful credit history (and also those not damaged by the calamity) pay 
higher interest rates. All these features helped damaged people to recover and repay 
both new and previous loans. However, we also document an abnormal and significant 
increase in default rates of non victims suggesting the existence of contagion and/or 
strategic default problems. For this reason we suggest reconversion of donor aid into 
financial support to compulsory microinsurance schemes for borrowers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Natural catastrophes cause economic destruction and have severe consequences on 
household income, assets, welfare and nutrition. Over the last decades the variability 
as well as the frequency and strength of climate-related extremes have increased 
alarmingly. There are several reasons for this upward trend, the most relevant ones 
being human-driven climate changes and land misuse which have increased the 
number and severity of some type of disasters like hurricanes and floods. As it is well 
known, low and middle income countries suffer the most from these events due to 
unfavorable weather conditions, high population density, poor quality of buildings and 
infrastructures, lower insurance protection and, more in general, lower financial 
resources required to cope with them (Cummins and Mahul, 2009). These catastrophic 
events bring the economic system to an halt in a similar way to a heart attack. In 
order to restore financial and economic flows what is needed is a shock therapy (a 
defibrillator) which soon restores liquidity of the system. This is why in this dramatic 
scenario several authors have tested whether (survival and/or recapitalization of) 
microfinance institutions may help to compensate the losses and recover from natural 
catastrophes and investigated how the same local credit intermediaries - which are 
crucial to restore liquidity - may survive to the shock.  
In this respect, many studies document that support from MFIs can be scarce if their 
loan portfolios end up being severely damaged by the catastrophe, in which case the 
survival of the whole bank serving the poor can be at risk. Collier et al. (2011), using 
portfolio-level monthly data of a Peruvian MFI from January 1994 to October 2008, 
show that the 1997-1998 El Niño significantly increased loan problems. This is 
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because after a natural disaster a contemporaneous increase in the demand and a fall 
in the supply of credit - the latter due to an increase in bad loans - can generate a 
significant and long-lasting disequilibrium. Evidence of mismatches between demand 
and supply of credit after a natural catastrophe has been provided by Berg and 
Schrader (2009) who analyze the effect of volcanic eruptions in Ecuador on the 
demand for loans and access to credit. The authors show that, while the former 
increased due to volcanic activity, the latter was restricted for new clients.  
On the positive side Khandker (2007) documents with household-level panel data that 
the 1998 flood in Bangladesh increased vulnerability to poverty reducing both 
consumption and assets while microfinance helped to compensate the losses from the 
flood. In a similar vein Becchetti and Castriota (2010 and 2011) find that the 2004 
Tsunami caused significant economic and psychological losses and document that MFI 
recapitalization helped to recover pre-Tsunami welfare levels and achieve convergence 
with non-damaged individuals. 
Note however that during catastrophes credit mechanisms can worsen also due to 
strategic defaults and contagion and MFIs may be particularly vulnerable to these 
phenomena in presence of joint liability clauses. This is because under these 
contractual arrangements the default of one (or more) borrowers hit by the shock 
increases the burden of solvent groupmates not directly affected by the calamity. . 
Under these circumstances a “domino effect” can therefore lead to the default of the 
entire group and, eventually, of the whole MFI. Bratton (1986) shows that group 
lending is better than individual lending in good times, the reverse being true in times 
of crisis. Evidence of domino effects is provided by Paxton (1996) in Burkina Faso. 
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As a consequence, if borrowers believe that many clients will default, and that this 
would eventually lead the MFI to bankruptcy (or to require higher lending rates in the 
future to survive), they may strategically decide to default since microfinance 
institutions rely on the promise of future loans to induce repayment. Bond and Rai 
(2008) refer to such phenomenon as a borrowers’ run. Evidence in this sense is found 
in Goering and Marx (1998) in the case of Childreach in Ecuador where the number of 
defaults multiplied as the word spread that few people were paying back. Similar 
results are obtained with a different approach by Cassar and Wydick (2010) who carry 
out group lending experiments in five countries and demonstrate that players have an 
incentive to verify if they believe that a critical number of other group members will 
do the same.  
Our research aims at studying whether these phenomena are at work after a natural 
disaster by investigating the determinants of loan amounts and credit defaults in a Sri 
Lankan microfinance organization severely damaged by the 2004 Tsunami and 
recapitalized by Western donors after it. In our empirical investigation we rely on a 
broad range of controls which provide insights into the credit mechanisms of the 
institution and the clients’ repayment incentives. The focus is on the effects of the 
Tsunami on the MFI’s operating principles and on the borrowers’ insolvency.  
Two main results emerge from the empirical analysis. First, standard lending rules, 
which imply that clients do not obtain new loans until they repay old ones, are 
suspended in order to help Tsunami victims to recover from the catastrophe. Second, 
having been damaged by the 2004 Tsunami has no effect on credit defaults, after 
controlling for other confounding elements like socio-demographic and economic 
variables and external support and donations. This finding is paralleled after the 
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calamity (years 2004-2006) by a significant and unexpected increase in default rates of 
borrowers not affected by the Tsunami and a significant difference in (higher) lending 
rates paid by non victims vis à vis victims in the post-Tsunami period.  
This evidence suggests that strategic defaults and/or contagion may be in place - 
although our data do not allow us to disentangle the two phenomena.1 All these 
results imply that external support to MFIs with a relevant share of bad loans helps 
damaged people to recover from the calamity, but also generates moral hazard 
problems for non damaged under the assumption of asymmetric information between 
AMF and the latter. Our policy advice is that the problem could be avoided with the 
reconversion of donor aid into financial support to compulsory (calamity specific) 
microinsurance schemes attached to the loans. This would prevent borrowers 
unaffected by future calamities from having negative expectations on their own 
financial burden and on the MFI future survival, thereby preventing contagion and 
strategic default. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how the database 
has been created. Section 3 provides summary statistics and descriptive evidence of 
the MFI sample portfolio deterioration after the hazard. Section 4 reports econometric 
results over the determinants of loan amounts and credit defaults. Section 5 discusses 
the need of compulsory microinsurance schemes attached to bank loans as a possible 
solution to moral hazard problems. Section 6 concludes.  
 
                                                           
1 What may be inferred is that, would AMF be able to bridge after the tsunami the 
asymmetric information with borrowers, the strategic default rationale would be ruled 
out. We do not have however information which allows us to test this hypothesis.   
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2. The database 
 
Our database is created by merging bank records and survey data. It consists of 
information on 767 loans issued from 1995 to 2011 to 200 randomly sampled clients 
living in the villages of Galle, Matara and Hambantota by Agro Micro Finance, a Sri 
Lankan MFI headquartered in the capital Colombo with regional branches in the 
South-West of the country.  
The Tsunami was an unexpected event, therefore it was impossible to organize 
repeated interviews over time, before and after the catastrophe. For this reason we 
adopted the Retrospective Analysis of Fundamental Events Contiguous to Treatment 
(RETRAFECT) methodology used by McIntosh et al. (2011) which borrows from event 
studies used in the finance literature. This methodology relies on cross-sectional 
surveys to create a retrospective panel dataset based on fundamental events in the 
history of households.  
We interviewed MFI borrowers twice: the first time in April 2007 and the second in 
December 2011. Interviews were conducted at the monthly society meetings or at the 
clients’ homes and made use of professional translators who received intensive 
training by the team of researchers and Agro Micro Finance staff members. In April 
2007 respondents were asked to declare current and remember past levels of different 
wellbeing indicators by making reference to four different periods. We selected periods 
easy to remember due to the occurrence of memorable events.  
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The four considered time windows are: (P1) the six month interval before the first 
microfinance loan ever obtained; (P2) the period going from the first microfinance loan 
to the tsunami date (26th of December 2004); (P3) the period between the tsunami date 
and the first microfinance loan after tsunami and (P4) the period from the first 
microfinance loan after tsunami to the survey date (April 2007). In December 2011 we 
updated the project, which allowed us to collect additional information for a fifth 
window (P5) consisting of the six months preceding the interview. Figure 1 shows the 
time schedule of the two surveys and the five reconstructed windows. A first step of 
the research consisted in merging bank and survey data: in this way when studying 
the determinants of credit defaults we are able to provide, for each of the 767 loans 
released by the MFI, a number of additional controls.2 
More specifically, our records provide official bank information on loan characteristics 
such as initial and end dates, duration, amount released, interest rate charged, 
whether the loan has been repaid, and the number of previous loans and of previous 
defaults. As a complement, the two surveys allow us to collect information on socio-
demographic and economic variables, the damages suffered from the Tsunami, and the 
support received after the calamity from family members, friends, the Government 
and other organizations. This information is important since it can affect the demand 
for loans and the default rates.  
Another fundamental variable which could influence the two variables of interest is 
the initial income of the borrower. In fact, institutions achieving financial 
                                                           
2 In the estimates which follow the retrospective approach is used only to calculate income while all 
other data come from official bank files. Our results are robust to the omission of the income variable 
and therefore hold also when not using the retrospective approach. Evidence is omitted for reasons of 
space and available upon request. 
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sustainability could lend higher amounts to wealthier people whose implicit risk is 
lower, while organizations achieving outreach might privilege poorer clients. 
Similarly, default rates could be influenced by initial income in that, during difficult 
times, wealthier people can repay the loan without sacrificing basic needs such as 
nutrition and children education. Although at a first glance it is normal to believe that 
income is less memorable than other variables, Becchetti and Castriota (2011) find 
that it is strongly correlated with memories about average weekly hours of work, 
problems in providing daily meals to the family and self-declared satisfaction about 
overall economic situation. Answers about these variables are consistent for all the 
considered windows. For this reason, when running regressions we include in the 
specification the income of the previous window. 
 Given these database characteristics, from a methodological point of view our work 
has a number of strengths with respect to other articles studying the consequences of 
the Tsunami on economic and psychological variables (see, for example, Callen, 2009 
and Cassar et al., 2011). First, the impact of the hazard is measured at the individual 
and not at the village level as in many existing works, thereby preventing location bias 
problems. Second, we do not constrain ourselves to considering only whether the 
person experienced or not the calamity. In fact, we identify six different types of 
possible damages and build a proxy for the intensity of the shock. The six types of 
economic and psychological damages are: i) family members dead or injured; damages 
to ii) house; iii) office buildings; iv) working tools; v) raw materials; vi) economic 
activity in general. 3 
                                                           
3 Most borrowers were interviewed at home in the 2007 post-tsunami survey. Damages 
of those interviewed at AMF were checked. Hence we could personally verify that the 
damage variable were not affected by measurement error. 
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These original features help to solve the identification problem arising from the 
impossibility of randomizing ex ante the calamity experience, that is, the causality 
link from the Tsunami shock to loan preferences. In fact, it could be argued that 
wealthier and less risky borrowers selected areas (in which they have family, house and 
economic activities) which were more likely to be inundated by the Tsunami. This 
could be the case if rich people were willing to pay an extra price for houses with view 
on the ocean or if the closer distance from the coast implied higher revenues (e.g. 
coming from profitable businesses like tourism) or lower transportation costs due to 
better infrastructures and higher population density. 
Such interpretation is hardly plausible since: i) damaged and non damaged 
individuals living in the same villages are very similar with respect to observables 
(and, arguably, unobservables) (see section 3); ii) people in our sample did not change 
residence before and after the calamity; iii) the degree of heterogeneity among 
individuals is minimized by the fact that they are all clients of an MFI and received 
loans to finance business activities. As a consequence we expect that: i) attendance of 
entrepreneurship trainings and monthly borrowers meetings shaped a similar 
economic mentality; ii) interviewed borrowers are similar with respect to some 
unobservable factors (main suspect of self-selection) like sense of entrepreneurship 
and trustworthiness which helped them to pass the screening selection of the bank. 
Finally, it could be argued that the most severely hit by the natural calamity left their 
village and migrated somewhere else. Although we do not have official data on 
migration of clients before and after the Tsunami, the AMF management reports 
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anecdotic evidence in favour of the inexistence of a self-selection bias of the least 
damaged individuals, the possible incentive to stay being the possibility to receive new 
loans after the calamity.  This option would have been difficult to explore if a person 
applied for a loan in a new region after having lost all her belongings and without 
having previous successful track records. 
 
3. Descriptive statistics and balancing properties of damaged vs. non 
damaged before the Tsunami 
 
Table 1 provides a description of the variables used while Table 2 reports summary 
statistics. The average loan amount in December 2011 terms is above 66,000 Sri 
Lankan Rupees (Rps.), which is a considerable amount based on the local living 
standards. AMF’s declared policy, common to many similar institutions, is to start it 
with smaller loans in order to test the client’s ability to repay, while increasing over 
time the amount lent. From this point of view MFIs privilege financial sustainability 
to outreach since it is reasonable to assume that, at the beginning, when they are 
starting a new business, clients are more in need of funds but are also riskier. From 
Table 3 it is possible to observe that, net of the general upward trend over time, the 
average amounts of loans peaked after the Tsunami because of the combined effect of 
the increased demand to recover from the damages and bank recapitalization which 
generated an inflow of financial resources. In our sample 18% of loans have not been 
repaid: such a high share is due to the unexpected 2004 calamity which caused 
massive defaults, as shown in Table 3 where the 2005 90% peak is self-explaining. 
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The annualised nominal interest rate is around 37 percent. This rate is not 
particularly high if we consider the relatively high inflation rate which has ranged 
between 3 and 23 percent in the period under scrutiny, the small  average amount and 
the relatively short duration of loans which (compared to ordinary banks) boost the 
administrative expenses and force MFIs to charge high interest rates on loans 
(especially if we consider infra-annual loans) (Hardly et al., 2003). As shown in Table 3 
the average interest rate fluctuates over time according to market conditions, but 
decreases after the Tsunami because of donors’ constraints on the use of the released 
funds. In fact, damaged people were entitled to receive loans at favorable conditions 
(6% interest rate). The duration of the loans ranges from one day (0.03 months) for 
small amounts to four years for big amounts, for which the authorization of the 
regional or even central manager is required. The most common frequency schemes 
are based on monthly, followed by weekly and bi-monthly installments, even though 
bank managers are free to choose longer or shorter maturities depending on the 
amounts released, the type of businesses financed, the credit history and the distance 
from the local branch which affects the monitoring costs. Around 11% of loans have 
been issued to start a new business (start-up) or launch a new product (spin-off), 82% 
to finance ongoing businesses and 6% to recover from the natural calamity.  
The “source of the initiative” is a relevant aspect of the lender-borrower relationship 
which is able to influence the average amount of loans issued by a bank and the 
default rates. The possible “source of initiative” answers in our survey are: (i) AMF 
(35% of loans in our sample); (ii) the client, following the suggestion of a borrower who 
introduced him to the bank manager (35%); (iii) the client, spontaneously, without the 
support of anybody (29%).  
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On the one hand, people who spontaneously look for a loan are likely to be more 
proactive and enterprising, which is a signal the bank could use to identify the client’s 
profile. On the other hand, individuals who are introduced to AMF by senior clients 
benefit from “reputation spillovers”: new members joining a group “inherit” the good or 
bad reputation of the coalition, so that collective reputation turns out to be history 
dependent (Tirole, 1996). Furthermore, they become immediately part of a group of 
people with more similar characteristics and stronger social ties, which could affect 
loan amounts and default rates as shown by Cassar et al. (2007) with field 
experiments in South Africa and Armenia. As a consequence, whether proactive 
borrowers will obtain more/less money and will have higher/lower default rates is an 
empirical issue we are going to analyze with econometric regressions in section 4. 
The number of previously released and repaid loans ranges from 0 (new clients) to 27, 
while that of previous defaults from 0 to 2. The average distance from the closest AMF 
branch is 15 km, which is non-negligible given the poor quality of road infrastructures 
and the scarcity of own transportation means.  
In line with most MFIs, the vast majority of loans have been released to women. Age, 
education and family size are in line with regional values. Most borrowers are 
involved in manufacturing and trade, while a relevant share has more than one 
economic activity (the sum of the mean values of the dummies for the types of activity 
exceeds one). The average real monthly income in 2011 terms of the time window 
preceding the loan was around 34,000 Rps., ranging from 0 in the aftermath of the 
Tsunami for those severely hit by the wave to a maximum of 132,000 Rps. for 
successful entrepreneurs.  
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Around half (47%) of loans have been released to people damaged by the Tsunami, the 
number of damage types ranging from 0 to 6. Among the six types considered the first 
five refer to the direct shock caused by the calamity while the last one (damage to the 
economic activity) is indirect and refers to the decrease in market demand. From 
Table 2c it emerges that indirect effects are the most common (39%), followed by 
damages to raw materials (24%), working tools (18%), office buildings (17%) and house 
(11%), while those on family members are rare (1%). Note that the dummy variables 
for the damages and Sum of Damages are obviously zero for all loans released before 
the Tsunami event.  
With respect to external support, only 2% of loans have been provided to people 
receiving remittances from abroad, donations and subsidies being more frequent 
(respectively 5% and 11%). Finally, while loans provided by other MFIs and other 
people are extremely rare (1%), those provided by banks and family members or 
friends are more frequent (respectively 14% and 11%). 
Table 4 shows parametric tests for difference in means in terms of loans/borrower 
characteristics between damaged and non damaged. This is meant to test whether 
characteristics of the loans or those of the borrowers were significantly different and 
could drive (and bias) the econometric results of section 4. Note that all these variables 
are either time invariant or verified as being invariant before and after tsunami and 
therefore their values may be considered as pre-tsunami levels. Our tests document 
that the null of no difference in observable characteristics between the two groups is 
never rejected at 5% level (t-stats are always below 1.96).  
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The respect of balancing properties is likely to be due to the characteristics of our 
data. As discussed in the introduction our database is composed of people from the 
same villages living at a close distance from each other and all being members of the  
same MFI. Participation to one of the two (damaged/undamaged) groups is therefore 
likely to be due to casual factors such as natural barriers or small differences in 
distance from the coast. 
 
4. Econometric results 
 
4.1 Determinants of loan amounts 
We start our empirical analysis by studying the determinants of loan size in our 
sample. The estimated specification is: 
ij
j
jt
t
t
i
itiiti DvillageDYearXDamageLS εδγβαα +++++= ∑∑∑10
  (1)
 
The dependent variable (LS) is the loan size expressed in December 2011 terms and 
extracted from the AMF electronic database, while Damage is a unit dummy for 
borrowers hit by the Tsunami (always equal to zero before the catastrophe) which is 
introduced in the second specification (Table 5, column 2). Alternatively in column 3 
the dummy is replaced by six dummies related to the type of damage suffered and, in 
column 4, by the sum of damages. The X socio-demographic variables control for 
gender discrimination, role of seniority and education, household size, business of 
activity, initial income (of the time window preceding the loan), damages suffered from 
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the Tsunami and external support received. Regressions include village and time 
dummy variables (DYear and Dvillage) (results are omitted for reasons of space but 
are available upon request). Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level and 
reported in parentheses.  
A first main finding is that people hit by the Tsunami (Damage) receive more funds, 
the relevant type of damage being the indirect one to the economic activity (Damage: 
economic activity), while the index we built to measure the intensity of the damage 
does not seem an effective proxy to capture the consequences of the calamity (Table 5). 
The economic support AMF received from donors and international organizations was 
partly conditioned to the Tsunami victims being financed first, therefore the larger 
amounts lent to victims are not unexpected.  
However, it appears that AMF did not lend more to those suffering the most since 
direct damages (Table 5, column 4) and intensity of the damages (Table 5, column 5) 
are not significant.  
Turning to financial variables, while AMF clearly states its policy of lending smaller 
amounts to new clients and larger amounts to solvent borrowers, econometric results 
show that the number of previous loans is irrelevant for the amount released. This 
behavior does not closely correspond to patterns observed in microfinance markets 
where new clients are offered small loans to test their repayment behavior 
(Vogelgesang, 2003). 
An apparently counter-intuitive result is the positive - instead of negative – effect of 
previous defaults on the amount released by the bank. Ordinary banks and MFIs most 
often explicitly forbid to lend money to borrowers until they repay back the amount 
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due. Even if the money is finally repaid, MFIs generally use this piece of information 
to update the risk profile of the borrower. As a consequence, the coefficient attached to 
past defaults should be at least non-positive. The reason for this unexpected result is 
the Tsunami catastrophe which caused serious damages to the businesses and the 
properties of historically reliable clients (in our sample there are no defaults until the 
calamity occurred). Without further loans clients would have likely been unable to 
recover and, in turn, repay the previous loan4.  
The purpose for which the loan has been asked matters. Even though when starting a 
new business entrepreneurs need more financial resources, lending for a new business 
is perceived as riskier by the bank which provides smaller loans. In this case AMF 
seems to behave like traditional bank in that it privileges financial sustainability to 
outreach.  
With respect to the “source of initiative”, individuals who are introduced to AMF by 
another client receive the most, meaning that social ties and reputational spillovers 
are in place, followed by those who autonomously contact the MFI. Those who get a 
credit offer on the initiative of the bank receive the least since are less proactive and 
do not belong to well established and homogenous groups. A growing body of literature 
has proved the relevance of social networks in household decision-making (Conley and 
Udry, 2010) and of personal relationships in credit access, particularly in developing 
countries (Okten and Osili, 2004). In line with these intuitions Wydick et al. (2011), 
using survey of 465 households living in Western Guatemala, show that access to 
credit is closely related to membership of a church network. Our results add to Wydick 
                                                           
4 Given the dramatic event, AMF’s strategy is in contrast with policies adopted by other MFIs in more 
normal contexts like Caja Los Andes in Bolivia which does not provide new grants if a client has not 
repaid previous loans, as documented by Vogelgesang (2003). 
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et al. (2011) in that they study the determinants of access to credit, while our sample 
is entirely composed by clients and the dependent variable is the loan amount. Social 
ties not only increase access to credit through imitation phenomena as shown by 
Wydick et al. (2011), but also increase the average amount of loans through 
reputational spillovers. 
The distance from the MFI branch does not have any significant effect. This might be 
due to two counteracting forces: on the one hand, closer distance may allow better 
selection and monitoring of clients while, on the other, due to higher transaction costs 
(see Ashraf et al., 2006), lending to clients living farther away could be convenient 
only for larger amounts. Either the two effects cancel out or are not at work. 
When looking at the significance of other regressors, the negative coefficient attached 
to the female gender is surprising since microcredit was born to serve the poor, 
especially women. It is difficult to say whether such finding depends on discrimination 
or on unobservable gendered differences in financed project characteristics (i.e. women 
asking more consumption or small scale loans). Education has a positive effect on loan 
amounts, meaning that the bank may interpret it as a signal of lower risk profile. It is 
also likely that more educated people set more advanced, sophisticated and expensive 
businesses for which a higher amount of money is necessary. The remaining socio-
demographic variables are not significant at conventional levels. Initial income does 
not play any role: the MFI does not lend more neither to poorer nor to richer clients, 
therefore displaying a policy which tries to balance financial sustainability and 
outreach. External support in the form of subsidies, donations, remittances and other 
loans could have reduced in principle the need of credit, but in our regressions do not 
have any impact on the variable under scrutiny. 
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4.2 The determinants of credit defaults 
In Table 6 we report findings on the determinants of credit defaults based on the 
following specification 
ij
j
jt
t
t
i
itiiti DvillageDYearXDamageDefault εδγβαα +++++= ∑∑∑10
  (2)
 
where the dependent variable (Default) is a dummy equal to one if the loan has not 
been reimbursed, zero otherwise and the other variables are defined as in (1). Given 
the discrete nature of the variable the natural candidate for this type of investigation 
is a Logit model. Again, standard errors are clustered at the borrower level and 
reported in parentheses.  
The most interesting result is that the probability of default is neither affected by the 
Tsunami victim status nor by the intensity of the damages. This finding must imply 
on the descriptive side a significant increase in the default rate also of non victims in 
the Tsunami vis à vis the pre-Tsunami period in order to make the victim/non victim 
effect not significant. This is indeed what we find. Before the Tsunami the default rate 
of victims and non victims is respectively around 23 and 21 percent and not 
significantly different between the two groups (consistently with balancing properties 
shown in section 3.2). In the Tsunami period (2004-06) the default rate of victims and 
non victims raises to 58 and 50 percent, the difference being not statistically different 
here as well. This result is unexpected, since the Tsunami should not affect positively 
the probability of default of an individual declaring no damages to building, relatives 
or economic activity.  
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We identified two possible explanations for this anomaly: strategic defaults and 
contagion. It might be the case that, as for Childreach in Ecuador (Goering and Marx, 
1998), the word spread that few people were paying back the money and that AMF 
was going bankrupt. Another - not mutually exclusive - explanation is contagion, since 
during a hard time of local economic downturn the default of one or two members 
could have led to the insolvency of the entire group under group lending with joint 
liability. Contagion problems could have been particularly serious in the light of the 
restricted size of the groups formed by AMF (three members), which, on the one side, 
facilitates the creation and the management of groups, but, on the other, increases the 
burden for the remaining members in bad times.  
When inspecting other financial regressors we find that the interest rate is negatively 
correlated with default. Abbink et al. (2006) with laboratory experiments find that, on 
the one side, a higher repayment burden intensifies the incentives to free-ride since 
shirking allows to save money, but, on the other side, it implies a disciplining effect 
given that high-interest loans are less tolerant towards defaulters. Cull et al. (2007), 
using data from 124 institutions in 49 countries, compare group-based versus 
individual based microfinance institutions and show that, above a certain threshold, 
interest rates worsen the quality of portfolio in case of individual loans, but this 
relation does not exist for group-based microfinance institutions. Our results differ 
from those mentioned above since AMF carries out a cross-subsidization strategy 
which consists of increasing the interest rate to solvent clients in order to reduce it to 
bankrupt ones5.     
                                                           
5 Table A1 in the Appendix  shows the determinants of the interest rate applied by AMF to each loan: 
the main drivers of the cost of capital are the client’s distance from the local branch, the amount 
released, the duration and the number of successfully repaid loans. Previous defaults do not lead to an 
increase in the interest rate. 
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Longer maturities reduce default rates, but the frequency of repayments does not 
matter. Armendariz and Morduch (2005) with anecdotal evidence from Bangladeshi 
microfinance providers and Mcintosh (2008) with more formal analysis of microfinance 
contracts offered by FINCA in Uganda find that higher frequency of repayments is 
associated with lower default rates. However, this could be due to self-selection since 
clients chose their repayment schedule. Field and Pande (2008) use data from a field 
experiment with randomized client assignment to a weekly or monthly repayment 
schedule and find no significant effect of type of repayment schedule on client 
delinquency or default. Our results are consistent with theirs.  
In line with expectations, larger loans imply higher default rates. Credit history does 
not matter: neither the number of repaid loans nor that of defaults are predictors of 
current insolvency. This finding is important since it shows that natural calamities 
can lead people to bankruptcy, but do not generate repeated defaults. In other words, 
if borrowers receive new support the discontinuity is only temporary and not 
permanent. Next, while the nature of credit initiative affects the amount released by 
the bank, this is not the case for the default rates.  
The distance from the closest AMF branch has no effect on default rates: either closer 
distance does not imply better clients’ selection and stricter monitoring6 or, on the 
opposite, the selection was so effective that closer and farther clients ended up being 
homogeneous with respect to the risk profile: this point is left to future research. 
Finally, the default rate of loans issued to finance start-ups, established business or 
recovery are the same. Start-ups may show similar mortality rates to other businesses 
                                                           
6 Distance among members of the same group has been shown to affect peer monitoring and, in turn, 
repayment rates (Wydick, 1999). The same principle could have, but does not, work for the borrower-
lender relationship. 
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because of contextual factors - small businesses in a growing developing country - 
which provide consumers’ demand and reduce the minimum efficient size of the firm.  
With respect to the significance of the remaining regressors we document that socio-
demographic controls do not matter. Gender, age, education and number of house 
members have no effect on repayment rates. Age - a proxy for work experience and 
wealth - has a negative but not significant effect. Household size could have had a 
negative effect due to the large family “fixed costs” during calamities and economic 
downturns, but also a positive one due to the available and free workforce. Either none 
or both effects are at work here, the final result being null. Past income does not help 
reducing default risk: this is probably so because, on the one hand, higher income 
allows more savings, but, on the other, it is a proxy for larger activities which are less 
flexible on the costs side when the business climate worsens.  
 
4.3 Further evidence on the contagion/strategic default hypothesis 
To elaborate more around our contagion/strategic default hypothesis we look at 
determinants of defaults for the control group of non damaged only (Table 7) and find 
a significant and positive effect of the dummy picking up the post-Tsunami period. 
Hence, even though non damaged do not declare any consequence of the tsunami 
(including the indirect effect of a demand reduction), they suffer an unexpected 
increase in default rates in such period. Hence the jump in default rates documented 
with descriptive findings in section 4.2 is confirmed after controlling for confounding 
factors in econometric estimates. 
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A second interesting piece of evidence is the comparison of interest rates between 
damaged and non damaged in the post-tsunami period. What we find is that the non 
damaged pay 8 percent more and the difference is significant (p-value 0.002). The 
consequence of this finding is that non damaged which are groupmates of damaged 
members have a clear cost in not declaring default, that is, they pay a higher interest 
rate and, due to the joint liability clause, they may be asked to contribute to pay the 
loan of their unsolved groupmates hit by the Tsunami. The cost of not declaring 
strategic default may be a rationale to explain the unexpected increase in default for 
non damaged in the post tsunami period. 
In our database we do not have information on dropouts and therefore the suspicion 
that our findings may be affected by survivorship bias may arise. Survivorship is 
generally not balanced between “good” and “bad” borrowers and it may therefore 
generate a bias via exclusion of a higher share of bankrupt than succcesful borrowers 
from the sample. In such case, with reference to our main two dependent variables, it 
would bias downward overall sample default rates while the effect on lending rates 
would be uncertain (or it may be assumed to generate an upward bias since we found 
that cross-subsidisation from good borrowers is at stake). Note however that it is 
reasonable to assume that, if the bias exists, it affects in the same way damaged and 
non damaged in the pre-tsunami period (damaged and non damaged have not 
significantly different characteristics ex ante) thereby not altering our main results on 
the insignificant impact of damaged status on post tsunami defaults. Moreover, in our 
specific case we verified that AMF lends also to clients who have a record of past 
default and this minimizes the number of dropouts due to misperformance. 
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Last, with regard to the post-tsunami period, we know that the support from foreign 
donors is explicitly targeted to loan concession to borrowers defaulting due to the 
tsunami. Hence the potential unbalance between damaged and non damaged dropouts 
after the tsunami is eliminated by such intervention.  All this being considered the 
problem may be considered negligible and not affecting our main findings. 
 
5. Ex-ante coping strategies and the need for microinsurance shemes 
 
Loans provided by MFIs after natural calamities have been proved to be a helpful 
recovery tool for the victims (Khandker, 2007; Becchetti and Castriota, 2011). Ex-post 
recapitalization of a struggling MFI with funds provided by donors, NGOs or 
international organizations is a solution which has been adopted, among others, by the 
MFI under scrutiny, since neither microinsurance nor contingent repayment schemes 
were in place at the time of the Tsunami.   
However, relying on non automatic but voluntary external fund schemes to 
recapitalize a deteriorated loan portfolio after calamities is risky for a number of 
reasons. First, it is not sure whether the institution will find available donors or 
partners since, when natural catastrophes occur, the number of potential beneficiaries 
gets large and the competition among them keen. Second, recapitalizations necessarily 
occur with a delay, which can worsen the already fragile financial situation of current 
and potential borrowers looking for new loans.7 Third, because of the delay and of 
                                                           
7 As noted by Cummins and Mahul (2009, p.1), “Post-disaster assistance from the 
international donor community may be slow and unreliable. In the face of the rising 
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rational/irrational expectations, ex-post solutions do not prevent contagion and moral 
hazard problems connected to strategic defaults. 
Two similar solutions seem appropriate to prevent these two latter phenomena: 
microinsurance schemes attached to loans and contingent repayment systems which 
allow rescheduling of savings and installments after natural disasters for affected 
members. Since 2002 most MFIs in Bangladesh have been introducing this type of 
scheme (Dowla and Barua, 2006), which in a rural Bangladesh context has been 
shown to decrease the probability that people skip meals during negative shocks 
(Shoji, 2009). However, while the second solution seems adequate in case of natural 
catastrophes which occur on a more regular basis like floods in Bangladesh, the first 
seems more effective in case of unpredictable and devastating disasters like the 2004 
Asian Tsunami since it does not just postpone, but rather cancel, the outstanding debt. 
This difference can be of paramount importance when a borrower needs money to 
recover from the catastrophe while the repayment of previous loans prevents the issue 
of new ones. Furthermore, rescheduling can help to cope with strategic defaults and 
contagion but does not prevent credit restrictions - especially to new clients. 
Even though with this dataset we are unable to disentangle the relevance of strategic 
defaults from that of contagion, a compulsory microinsurance attached to the loans 
would have prevented both problems and the AMF portfolio deterioration. In fact, it 
should be kept in mind that in the first quarter of 2005, before receiving foreign 
support, AMF was technically bankrupt. However, nothing ensures that, if another 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
frequency and intensity of losses in low- and middle-income countries, the old model of 
post-disaster financing and reliance on the donor community is increasingly 
inefficient”. 
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catastrophe occurred in the future, further external funds from NGOs and other 
donors would be obtained. This problem is even more severe since AMF clients have 
experienced international solidarity and refinancing from the bank, therefore they are 
likely to expect further assistance and support in case of future natural hazards. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Very few evidence on the impact of microfinance as post-calamity recovery mechanism 
exists. We use a unique database made of official bank loans and survery submitted in 
2007 and 2011 to evaluate the impact of donors recapitalization of a Sri Lankan MFI 
after the Tsunami. Our data show that the donors’ intervention was effective in 
supporting victims who received large loans at subsidized rates after their post-
Tsunami default. The high default rates among non victim borrowers after the 
Tsunami suggest, however, the occurrence of contagion and/or strategic default as it 
typically occurs after natural disasters when group lending and joint liability clauses 
are at work. The hypothesis of contagion or strategic default is reinforced by evidence 
showing that non declaring default for non victims has a cost since their post-Tsunami 
lending rate is significantly higher than that of victims due to a cross-subsidisation 
mechanism in place. 
We suggest that the reconversion of the donors’ fund into a compulsory post-calamity 
insurance for all borrowers may maintain the positive post-intervention effects while 
solving problems of contagion and strategic default. 
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Figure 1: Time schedule of the two surveys and the five reconstructed time windows 
 
P1= six month interval before first AMF financing. 
P2= period ranging from first AMF financing to the tsunami date (December 2004). 
P3= period ranging from the tsunami date to the first AMF refinancing. 
P4= period ranging from the first AMF refinancing to first the survey date (April 2007). 
P5= six month interval before the second survey (December 2011). 
 
Note: Dotted lines indicate non overlapping window borders, continuous lines coincident window borders. 
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Table 1: Description of the variables used 
    
  Table 1a: Financial variables 
Loan size Amount of the AMF loan in December 2011 terms 
Default DV=1 if the loan has not been repaid, 0 otherwise 
Interest rate Annual nominal interest rate on the loan  
Duration Duration of the loan in months 
Frequency Number of installments per month 
Reason: new business DV=1 if the loan has been asked to open a new business, 0 otherwise 
Reason: improve  DV=1 if the loan has been asked to improve an existing business, 0 otherwise 
Reason: recover DV=1 if the loan has been asked to recover from the damages, 0 otherwise 
Initiative: AMF DV=1 if , 0 otherwise 
Initiative: suggested DV=1 if , 0 otherwise 
Initiative: spontaneously DV=1 if , 0 otherwise 
Previous defaults Number of previous loans which have not been repaid 
Previous repaid loans Number of previous loans which have been successfully repaid 
Distance AMF Distance from the closest AMF branch in km 
Table 1b: Socio-demographic variables 
Female DV=1 if the respondent is female, 0 otherwise 
Age Age of the respondent in years 
Education Education of the respondent in years 
House members Number of people living in the house 
Fishery DV=1 if the respondent is involved in fishery, 0 otherwise 
Manufactory DV=1 if the respondent is involved in manufactory, 0 otherwise 
Trade DV=1 if the respondent is involved in trade, 0 otherwise 
Other job DV=1 if the respondent has another  
Real income Real total household income in December 2011 terms 
Matara DV=1 if the respondent lives in Matara, 0 otherwise 
Hambantota DV=1 if the respondent lives in Hambantota, 0 otherwise 
Galle DV=1 if the respondent lives in Galle, 0 otherwise 
Table 1c: Damages from the Tsunami and support received 
Damaged DV=1 if the respondent has been damaged by the Tsunami, 0 otherwise 
Damage: family DV=1 if the respondent reported damages to the family, 0 otherwise 
Damage: house DV=1 if the respondent reported damages to the house, 0 otherwise 
Damage: office building DV=1 if the respondent reported damages to the office building, 0 otherwise 
Damage: working tools DV=1 if the respondent reported damages to the working tools, 0 otherwise 
Damage: raw materials DV=1 if the respondent reported damages to the raw materials, 0 otherwise 
Damage: economic activity DV=1 if the respondent reported damages to the economic activity, 0 otherwise 
Sum of damages Number of types of damage from 0 to 6 
Remittances DV=1 if the respondent receives remittances, 0 otherwise 
Subsidies DV=1 if the respondent receives subsidies, 0 otherwise 
Donations and grants DV=1 if the respondent receives donations and grants, 0 otherwise 
Loans: bank DV=1 if the respondent has obtained other loans from a bank, 0 otherwise 
Loans: MFI DV=1 if the respondent has obtained other loans from another MFI, 0 otherwise 
Loans: family/friend DV=1 if the respondent has obtained other loans from family/friends, 0 otherwise 
Loans: other DV=1 if the respondent has obtained other loans from other people, 0 otherwise 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Table 2a: Financial variables 
Loan size 767 66,131 60,629 4,459 324,720 
Default 734 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Interest rate 767 36.87 23.63 6 101 
Duration 765 10.18 7.77 0.03 47.97 
Frequency 755 4.12 6.13 0.05 30 
Reason: new business 767 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Reason: improve  767 0.82 0.39 0 1 
Reason: recover 767 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Initiative: AMF 733 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Initiative: suggested 733 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Initiative: spontaneously 733 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Previous defaults 767 0.25 0.46 0 2 
Previous repaid loans 767 3.23 4.97 0 27 
Distance AMF 761 15.16 9.26 0.1 65 
Table 2b: Socio-demographic variables 
Female 767 0.88 0.33 0 1 
Age 766 47.40 9.58 20 67 
Education 757 11.15 2.45 0 16 
House members 767 4.45 1.51 1 10 
Fishery 761 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Manufactory 761 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Trade 761 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Other job 761 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Real income 767 34,213 23,306 0 132,978 
Matara 767 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Hambantota 767 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Galle 767 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Table 2c: Damages from the Tsunami and support received 
Damaged 767 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Damage: family 767 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Damage: house 767 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Damage: office building 767 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Damage: working tools 767 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Damage: raw materials 767 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Damage: economic activity 767 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Sum of damages 767 1.11 1.55 0 6 
Remittances 767 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Subsidies 764 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Donations and grants 767 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Loans: bank 766 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Loans: MFI 766 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Loans: family/friend 766 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Loans: other 760 0.01 0.12 0 1 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of selected variables, by year 
     Year Obs. Loan size Interest rate Default (%) 
2000 10 32,402 27 0 
2001 22 27,157 51 0 
2002 39 34,042 40 0 
2003 83 36,398 37 0.05 
2004 126 37,067 41 0.39 
2005 75 59,216 31 0.90 
2006 54 109,780 23 0.57 
2007 123 82,369 26 0.05 
2008 133 84,160 51 0 
2009 60 75,143 42 0 
2010 22 127,013 19 0 
2011 18 97,053 20 0 
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Table 4: Difference in mean between damaged/non damaged 
Variable Damaged Non damaged Difference T-stat 
     Table 4a: Financial variables 
Loan size 34,695 32,215 -2,479 -0.56 
Default 0.04 0.00 0.04 -1.39 
Interest rate 40.51 37.00 -3.51 0.88 
Duration 8.62 8.44 -0.18 -0.21 
Frequency 4.54 4.04 0.50 -0.34 
Reason: new business 0.15 0.09 -0.06 -0.99 
Reason: improve  0.85 0.90 0.05 0.87 
Reason: recover 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
Initiative: AMF 0.35 0.38 0.03 0.37 
Initiative: suggested 0.36 0.25 -0.11 -1.24 
Initiative: spontaneously 0.28 0.36 0.07 0.88 
Previous defaults 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.35 
Previous repaid loans 0.92 0.88 -0.04 -0.17 
Distance AMF 14.48 13.54 -0.94 -0.58 
Matara 0.45 0.60 0.15 1.81 
Hambantota 0.28 0.16 -0.12 -1.45 
Galle 0.26 0.21 -0.05 -0.62 
Table 4b: Socio-demographic variables 
Female 0.82 0.86 0.03 0.48 
Age 45.01 45.57 0.55 0.34 
Education 10.93 11.57 0.63 1.40 
House members 4.76 4.30 -0.45 -1.94 
Fishery 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.60 
Manufactory 0.38 0.30 -0.07 -0.87 
Trade 0.30 0.45 0.14 1.69 
Other job 0.16 0.04 -0.11 -1.94 
Real income 34,307 36,458 2,151 0.51 
          
 
Legend: Data refer to the first two time windows (P1 and P2), before the Tsunami. 
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Table 5: Determinants of loan size 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Damaged 25,139*** 
(7,600) 
Damage: family -5,845 
(23,313) 
Damage: house 8,094 
(14,500) 
Damage: office building 3,103 
(10,436) 
Damage: working tools -16,532 
(11,269) 
Damage: raw materials 11,044 
(11,154) 
Damage: ec. Activity 17,804** 
(7,343) 
Sum of damages 3,607 
          (2,581) 
Previous defaults 6,280 6,497 6,875 6,484 
(7,284) (6,785) (7,532) (7,216) 
Distance AMF 198.8 218.6 204.8 203.7 
(291.1) (266.0) (272.1) (289.1) 
Reason: new business -12,401 -12,096* -11,485 -10,352 
(7,910) (7,069) (7,244) (7,662) 
Reason: improve  12,408 12,052* 13,358* 14,891* 
(7,941) (7,110) (7,448) (7,853) 
Previous repaid loans -2,433*** -2,911*** -2,850*** -2,535*** 
(684.3) (688.4) (698.4) (725.7) 
Previous defaults 6,280 6,497 6,875 6,484 
(7,284) (6,785) (7,532) (7,216) 
Initiative: suggested 21,077*** 19,853*** 19,068*** 20,233*** 
(6,469) (6,065) (6,019) (6,688) 
Initiative: spontaneously 14,524** 11,846* 11,821* 13,192* 
(7,219) (6,926) (6,701) (7,328) 
(5,758) (5,619) (5,245) (5,384) (5,593) 
Female -23,358** -25,966*** -29,013*** -28,200*** -27,187*** 
(9,612) (8,950) (8,482) (8,811) (8,849) 
Age 79.47 -27.28 25.85 -48.08 13.95 
(315.8) (364.0) (349.6) (357.2) (369.4) 
Education 2,054* 2,710** 3,238*** 2,960*** 2,785** 
(1,086) (1,137) (1,054) (1,060) (1,135) 
House members 1,446 2,285 1,647 2,174 2,316 
(1,826) (1,708) (1,659) (1,712) (1,717) 
Fishery 12,430 11,117 3,542 6,483 9,221 
(15,363) (14,945) (14,938) (14,253) (15,470) 
Manufactory -2,549 -4,147 -6,087 -6,585 -6,047 
(6,297) (6,230) (5,923) (6,225) (6,437) 
Trade 1,147 -2,957 -6,081 -5,563 -4,678 
(5,758) (5,619) (5,245) (5,384) (5,593) 
Other job 1,546 1,134 2,472 3,033 562.5 
(8,963) (9,112) (8,590) (8,720) (9,232) 
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(Cont.) 
 
Remittances -17,836 -17,733 -13,177 -13,440 -16,232 
 (21,043) (23,081) (19,239) (22,469) (21,533) 
Subsidies -15,971* -12,345 -15,153* -14,563* -12,523 
(8,784) (7,948) (7,859) (8,289) (8,058) 
Donations and grants 17,393 10,977 5,609 6,456 5,537 
(10,977) (10,996) (10,870) (12,161) (12,432) 
Loans: bank 10,727 3,563 1,611 2,387 525.5 
(10,529) (9,485) (9,478) (9,067) (9,807) 
Loans: MFI 2,244 4,650 2,584 2,557 3,968 
(15,006) (15,715) (14,606) (14,715) (15,689) 
Loans: family/friend -37.18 -5,132 -4,108 -5,430 -6,531 
(8,718) (7,545) (7,211) (7,274) (7,327) 
Loans: other 8,385 -6,715 -4,698 -5,983 -7,146 
(17,144) (14,859) (13,564) (13,899) (14,785) 
Real income 0.0410 0.138 0.164 0.150 0.143 
  (0.147) (0.153) (0.153) (0.148) (0.156) 
 
Observations 749 702 702 702 702 
R-squared 0.237 0.294 0.316 0.309 0.299 
 
Legend: The dependent variable is Loan Amount (the amount of the loan in December 2011 terms). 
Results come from OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the borrower level. Regressions 
make use of time and village dummy variables (omitted for reasons of space but available upon 
request). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: Determinants of credit defaults 
      Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Damaged 0.232 
(0.437) 
Damage: family 1.262 
(1.359) 
Damage: house -0.819 
(0.711) 
Damage: office building -0.0170 
(0.727) 
Damage: working tools 0.0754 
(0.833) 
Damage: raw materials 0.0180 
(0.616) 
Damage: econ. activity 0.725 
(0.570) 
Sum of damages 0.0338 
          (0.165) 
Distance AMF 0.00308 0.00421 0.00750 0.00361 
(0.0207) (0.0204) (0.0211) (0.0203) 
Reason: new business 0.0427 0.0495 -0.131 0.0485 
(0.616) (0.624) (0.685) (0.624) 
Reason: improve  -0.127 -0.114 -0.318 -0.108 
(0.601) (0.605) (0.679) (0.627) 
Loan amount 1.83e-05*** 1.79e-05*** 1.80e-05*** 1.81e-05*** 
(4.02e-06) (3.96e-06) (4.01e-06) (4.07e-06) 
Interest rate -0.0304** -0.0306** -0.0308** -0.0303** 
(0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0151) (0.0147) 
Previous repaid loans -0.129 -0.125 -0.161 -0.127 
(0.105) (0.103) (0.111) (0.105) 
Previous defaults -0.556 -0.560 -0.562 -0.559 
(0.751) (0.754) (0.764) (0.752) 
Initiative: suggested -0.930* -0.934* -0.984* -0.920* 
(0.545) (0.543) (0.552) (0.544) 
Initiative: spontaneously  -0.478 -0.491 -0.388 -0.477 
  (0.446) (0.451) (0.452) (0.446) 
 
(Cont.) 
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(Cont.) 
            
Female -0.134 -0.0175 -0.0318 0.0168 -0.0228 
(0.430) (0.693) (0.687) (0.690) (0.697) 
Age -0.0194 -0.0113 -0.0111 -0.0113 -0.0115 
(0.0155) (0.0210) (0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0211) 
Education -0.0436 -0.121 -0.115 -0.125 -0.119 
(0.0595) (0.0774) (0.0779) (0.0834) (0.0776) 
House members 0.00206 0.0545 0.0481 0.0402 0.0522 
(0.120) (0.158) (0.157) (0.154) (0.156) 
Fishery 1.942** 0.482 0.414 0.351 0.471 
(0.938) (1.577) (1.612) (1.568) (1.584) 
Manufactory -0.0367 -0.381 -0.400 -0.415 -0.391 
(0.364) (0.408) (0.412) (0.423) (0.410) 
Trade 0.327 0.158 0.141 0.0874 0.151 
(0.368) (0.433) (0.437) (0.468) (0.431) 
Other job 0.375 -0.736 -0.761 -0.810 -0.736 
(0.448) (0.602) (0.621) (0.634) (0.609) 
Remittances -2.741 -1.880* -1.835* -1.818 -1.876* 
(2.938) (1.072) (1.063) (1.144) (1.072) 
Subsidies 0.561 0.637 0.630 0.717 0.630 
(0.527) (0.711) (0.712) (0.787) (0.716) 
Donations and grants 0.479 0.558 0.480 0.662 0.511 
(0.579) (0.731) (0.740) (0.747) (0.762) 
Loans: bank -0.298 -1.205 -1.221 -1.368 -1.213 
(0.582) (0.894) (0.900) (0.954) (0.901) 
Loans: MFI 1.146 0.512 0.525 0.551 0.517 
(0.957) (0.710) (0.700) (0.707) (0.704) 
Loans: family/friend -0.814** -0.390 -0.388 -0.357 -0.396 
(0.405) (0.501) (0.506) (0.526) (0.510) 
Loans: other -0.478 0.474 0.510 0.406 0.501 
(0.932) (0.793) (0.795) (0.782) (0.784) 
Real income 4.78e-06 3.27e-06 3.56e-06 3.53e-06 3.37e-06 
  (6.29e-06) (7.63e-06) (7.65e-06) (8.33e-06) (7.72e-06) 
Duration  -0.273*** -0.269*** -0.268*** -0.271*** 
  (0.0592) (0.0602) (0.0600) (0.0602) 
Frequency  -0.00591 -0.00692 -0.0139 -0.00620 
  (0.0380) (0.0380) (0.0377) (0.0381) 
Observations 717 660 660 660 660 
R-squared 0.530 0.642 0.642 0.646 0.642 
 
Legend: The dependent variable is Default (dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan has not been repaid, 0 
otherwise). Results come from Logit regressions with standard errors clustered at the borrower level. 
Regressions make use of time and village dummy variables (omitted for reasons of space but available 
upon request). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7: Determinants of credit defaults, only damaged 
Variables Coeff. Robust Std. Err. 
Female 0.205 -0.606 
Age -0.0074 -0.0212 
Education -0.0634 -0.0778 
House members 0.243 -0.174 
Fishery 3.257* -1.808 
Manufactory -0.339 -0.466 
Trade -0.387 -0.49 
Other job -0.997 -0.685 
Remittances - - 
Subsidies -0.678 -0.845 
Donations and grants 0.79 -1.155 
Loans: bank 0.88 -0.668 
Loans: MFI 1.309 -1.444 
Loans: family/friend -0.563 -0.524 
Loans: other - - 
Real income -7.55E-06 -8.89E-06 
Distance AMF 0.0283 -0.0229 
Reason: new business -0.72 -1.661 
Reason: improve  -0.872 -1.618 
Loan amount 9.02e-06* -4.65E-06 
Interest rate -0.0148 -0.0162 
Previous repaid loans -0.255 -0.156 
Previous defaults 0.368 -0.522 
Initiative: suggested -0.506 -0.536 
Initiative: spontaneously -0.362 -0.487 
Duration -0.0328 -0.0811 
Frequency 0.0563 -0.0379 
DV years 2004-2006 3.882*** -0.622 
DV years 2007-2011 -1.735 -1.687 
      
Observations 335 
R-squared 0.474 
 
Legend: The dependent variable is Default (dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan has not been repaid, 0 
otherwise). Results come from Logit regressions with standard errors clustered at the borrower level. 
The regression makes use of village dummy variables (omitted for reasons of space but available upon 
request). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A1: Determinants of loan interest rate 
            
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female 2.030 -0.552 -0.886 -0.800 -0.675 
(4.083) (2.221) (2.192) (2.242) (2.240) 
Age -0.0879 -0.0470 -0.0439 -0.0593 -0.0432 
(0.133) (0.0775) (0.0768) (0.0765) (0.0763) 
Education 0.461 0.283 0.352 0.300 0.294 
(0.472) (0.245) (0.249) (0.256) (0.247) 
House members 0.160 0.463 0.419 0.521 0.471 
(0.878) (0.449) (0.455) (0.458) (0.455) 
Fishery -11.63** -6.054 -6.691 -5.786 -6.198 
(4.985) (5.019) (4.999) (4.979) (4.992) 
Manufactory 1.428 -0.102 -0.314 -0.132 -0.289 
(3.455) (1.491) (1.453) (1.452) (1.450) 
Trade -4.823 -0.439 -0.759 -0.694 -0.603 
(2.942) (1.417) (1.370) (1.378) (1.368) 
Other job -3.220 -2.255 -2.126 -2.153 -2.315 
(4.824) (2.332) (2.321) (2.326) (2.337) 
Remittances -7.587** -3.535 -3.122 -2.039 -3.408 
(3.146) (4.882) (5.088) (4.289) (5.050) 
Subsidies -0.631 -2.848 -3.191 -4.151* -2.879 
(4.422) (2.316) (2.291) (2.263) (2.327) 
Donations and grants -3.357 2.575 1.991 1.804 2.023 
(4.245) (2.858) (2.904) (2.660) (2.792) 
Loans: bank 1.476 2.327 2.186 2.515 2.049 
(4.406) (1.964) (1.984) (2.050) (2.031) 
Loans: MFI -13.61** -9.143 -9.279 -10.30* -9.183 
(5.443) (6.316) (6.240) (6.209) (6.318) 
Loans: family/friend 0.180 -0.0251 0.0216 -0.287 -0.177 
(4.057) (2.198) (2.172) (2.138) (2.209) 
Loans: other -5.808 2.503 2.576 2.388 2.431 
(6.913) (6.929) (6.944) (7.004) (6.925) 
Real income 0.000186*** 3.21e-05 3.41e-05 3.17e-05 3.22e-05 
(6.85e-05) (2.85e-05) (2.88e-05) (2.87e-05) (2.85e-05) 
            
(Cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
(Cont.) 
            
Distance AMF 0.248*** 0.253*** 0.246*** 0.249*** 
(0.0621) (0.0623) (0.0616) (0.0624) 
Reason: new business -2.339 -2.334 -2.114 -2.145 
(2.679) (2.694) (2.801) (2.752) 
Reason: improve  -2.149 -2.142 -2.059 -1.904 
(2.130) (2.146) (2.357) (2.284) 
Loan amount -4.44e-05*** -4.80e-05*** -4.72e-05*** -4.51e-05*** 
(1.57e-05) (1.58e-05) (1.54e-05) (1.57e-05) 
Previous repaid loans 0.998*** 0.958*** 0.946*** 0.992*** 
(0.304) (0.297) (0.304) (0.299) 
Previous defaults 0.0792 0.112 -0.309 0.0938 
(2.061) (2.031) (1.986) (2.050) 
Initiative: suggested -1.392 -1.418 -1.470 -1.453 
(1.440) (1.430) (1.437) (1.470) 
Initiative: spontaneously 2.611 2.433 2.174 2.505 
(1.706) (1.718) (1.773) (1.759) 
Duration -1.871*** -1.866*** -1.877*** -1.870*** 
(0.220) (0.221) (0.219) (0.221) 
Frequency -0.187 -0.224 -0.183 -0.199 
(0.249) (0.252) (0.254) (0.248) 
Damaged -1.366 
(4.166) 
Damage: family 2.636 
(2.916) 
Damage: house 4.371* 
(2.344) 
Damage: office building -4.752 
(2.898) 
Damage: working tools -0.378 
(2.198) 
Damage: raw materials 1.743 
(2.076) 
Damage: econ. activity 2.535 
(1.953) 
Sum of damages 0.351 
(0.563) 
            
Observations 749 690 690 690 690 
R-squared 0.215 0.647 0.648 0.652 0.647 
 
Legend: The dependent variable is the interest loan charged to the borrowers. Results come from OLS 
regressions with standard errors clustered at the borrower level. Regressions make use of time and 
village dummy variables (omitted for reasons of space but available upon request). Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
